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RIDDING THE LAW OF OUTDATED STATUTORY
EXEMPTIONS TO ANTITRUST LAW:
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Anne McGinnis*
Antitrust law is designed to be an overarching check against anticompetitive con-
duct that harms the free market system. Almost as soon as the first antitrust laws
were enacted in the United States, however, industry groups began lobbying Con-
gress for exemptions from these laws. Most of the statutory exemptions created over
the last one hundred years remain in place, despite widespread changes in economic
theory, market structures, and overall antitrust law. Today, some exemptions are
merely irrelevant, while others actively harm society by transferring wealth to pri-
vate individuals and hampering beneficial competition. This Note proposes a four-
part legislative solution to rid the law of stale or harmful exemptions while preserv-
ing those that respect the bedrock principles of antitrust law.
INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Topco Associates, Justice Thurgood Marshall fa-
mously wrote that “[a]ntitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act
in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as
important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedoms.”1 Despite Justice Marshall’s state-
ment, there are at least thirty-five federal statutory exemptions to
the broad protections of the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, and other bedrock antitrust statutes. Some grant
immunity to whole industries. Others exempt certain types of be-
havior from challenge.
Most of the statutory exemptions enacted over the last one hun-
dred years are still in place today, despite widespread changes in
economic theory, market structures, and antitrust law in general.
When initially enacted, many statutory exemptions were seen as
special-interest legislation harmful to competition, competitors,
and society. While others were beneficial when first put into law,
even many of those have grown irrelevant over time. Some have
* J.D., May 2014, University of Michigan Law School. The author would like to thank
Steven J. Cernak for his thoughtful feedback and guidance throughout the writing process, as
well as Cali Cope-Kasten and Andrew Tonelli for all of their editorial insights.
1. 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
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even become as harmful as those enacted with the intent of benefit-
ting special interests.
This Note proposes a way to reduce the number of exemptions
in effect, enabling a return to the bedrock principles of antitrust
law. Part I provides background information on antitrust law and
statutory exemptions. Part II discusses the need for reform. Part III
proposes a legislative solution that combines a general sunset on all
statutory exemptions after a fixed period of time, a Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report on the continuing need for
each statutory exemption currently in place, hearings on any ex-
emption found to be still warranted by the GAO, and further
legislation reinstating any exemption found warranted by Congress.
This Note argues that such a solution would jump start the debate
on whether to repeal the more controversial statutory exemptions
currently in effect while allowing the less controversial exemptions
to be taken out of the United States Code without wasting congres-
sional time or expense on exemption-by-exemption repeal. Because
this solution shifts the burden back onto an exemption’s propo-
nents to prove—both to a neutral expert within the GAO and to
Congress—that a favored exemption is necessary, it will rid the sys-
tem of irrelevant or harmful exemptions while preserving only
those that are beneficial to society at large.
I. ANTITRUST LAW AND STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS
A. Economic Theory, Purpose, and the Evolution of Antitrust Law
Three principal antitrust statutes outlaw anticompetitive behav-
ior in the United States: the Sherman Act,2 the Clayton Act,3 and
the Federal Trade Commission Act.4 Section 1 of the Sherman Act
criminalizes “[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations.”5 Section 2 criminalizes monopolization, at-
tempted monopolization, or conspiracy to monopolize “any part of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions.”6 The Clayton Act forbids certain individuals “engag[ing] in
commerce” from performing specific acts.7 For example, section 2
2. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006).
3. See Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2006).
4. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
6. Id. § 2.
7. Id. § 13(a).
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of the Clayton Act forbids price discrimination,8 while section 3 for-
bids tying9 and exclusive dealing.10 The Federal Trade Commission
Act grants the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) power to enjoin
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”11
Two characteristics shared by these three statutes are important
to note. First, they are incredibly broad: together, they give the De-
partment of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, state attorneys
general, and private plaintiffs the ability to challenge, either admin-
istratively or judicially, any anticompetitive behavior that affects
trade or commerce. Furthermore, modern courts interpret “trade
or commerce” expansively.12 Unless there is a specific statutory or
judicially created exemption, any conduct involving the exchange
of money or bartering for goods or services counts as “trade or
commerce.”13
8. Id.
9. Tying is an arrangement whereby a seller conditions the sale of one product or type
of product on the purchase of another product or type of product. Likewise, a tying arrange-
ment exists if a seller agrees to sell a product at a discounted price, but only if the buyer also
buys another product. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006), bars such agreements if the
agreement substantially lessens competition or tends to create a monopoly. See also United
Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006).
11. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). Other examples of an-
titrust legislation include statutes such as the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 15c–15h (2006), which deals with anticompetitive mergers; the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13–13b, 21a (2006), which increased anti-price discrimination
provisions of the original Clayton Act; and the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 18, 21 (2006), which clarified that the Clayton Act applied to both horizontal and vertical
mergers. All of these statutes are important to Antitrust Law in general but are beyond the
scope of this Note.
12. More specifically, the Sherman Act applies to “commerce among the several states,
or with foreign nations.” Section 1(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12(a), defines com-
merce as “trade or commerce among the several States and with foreign nations.” Section 4
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44, provides that “[c]ommerce means
commerce among the several states or with foreign nations.” Courts have interpreted this to
apply to any conduct that would fall under the Commerce Clause of the United States Consti-
tution, with one lingering exception for professional baseball. See Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat’l
League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (holding that baseball is not “com-
merce”). Note that this exception was created at a time when the Supreme Court read the
Commerce Clause much more narrowly than it does today. For most industries, the coverage
of antitrust laws has expanded alongside the expansion for the Commerce Clause. See AM.
BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, FEDERAL STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAW
7 & n.21 (2007) (“Indeed only in very limited, and sometimes exotic, circumstances have
modern courts found conduct to be outside the scope of antitrust.”) (citing a case where a
court held that solicitation of gratuitous charitable donations was not trade or commerce,
and was therefore outside the scope of antitrust regulation as one such odd example). But
neither the Court nor Congress has overruled Federal Baseball Club. See Id. at 5–6 & n.15
(2007) (“Namely, neither the Court nor Congress has ever overruled the Court’s sui generis
1922 rule that professional baseball is not ‘commerce.’”).
13. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 7
532 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 47:2
Second, these statutes operate at a high level of generality, and
their texts provide little detail to aid enforcement. The general pur-
pose and principles of the statutes are clear: they are designed to
protect economic liberty by preserving “free and unfettered compe-
tition”14 and are premised on the theory that “unrestrained
interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an en-
vironment conducive to the preservation of our democratic
political and social institutions.”15 However, the antitrust statutes do
not explicitly define what “free and unfettered competition” actu-
ally means. Antitrust law in the United States is therefore a judge-
made doctrine resting on top of a general statutory framework. As a
result, substantive antitrust law evolves with the economic theory
and political ideals of the day.16
Consequently, over the past seventy years, the doctrine has
changed enormously. From the 1940s through 1970, courts inter-
preted antitrust law expansively.17 Both private and public suits
were frequent, and plaintiffs usually won.18 Many business practices
were per se illegal,19 and courts often refused to allow a defendant
to proffer procompetitive justifications for their behavior, even if
compelling ones existed.20 Supreme Court decisions focused more
on protecting small businesses and individual competitors than on
14. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
15. Id.
16. See ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID & DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE REGULATION
1–3 (6th ed. 2010).
17. In the monopolization context, the Supreme Court seemed almost to adopt a no-
fault theory of monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Court still
required proof of bad acts in addition to market dominance, but lower courts defined “bad
acts” so broadly that almost any conduct was enough to create liability for a firm with monop-
oly power. See William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 17; see,
e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); Am. Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
18. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 33 (2007),
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report
.pdf; see generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION
1–10 (2005).
19. When a business behavior is per se illegal, if the plaintiff proves that the defendant
engaged in the conduct, the defendant is liable for a violation of antitrust laws; a defendant is
given no opportunity to explain that her conduct was in fact good for competition. Classic
examples that remain per se illegal today include horizontal price fixing, where two or more
competitors agree to buy or sell a product or service only for a certain price, see United States
v. Socony Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150 (1970), and horizontal market division, where two or more
competitors agree to buy or sell a product or service only in a specific geographic location or
market, see Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 734 (1988).
20. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 18, at 34.
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fostering efficiency and innovation-enhancing competition.21 To
the Warren Court, a competitive market was one that contained
many firms and where small firms had a right to compete with big-
ger ones, even if the small firms were less efficient.22
The leading economic theory of the day was structuralism, which
stated that, in a concentrated market, participants would inevitably
engage in anticompetitive behavior.23 To structuralists, an effective
antitrust policy was one directed at preventing market concentra-
tion by protecting small competitors, attacking collusion between
firms, and blocking mergers, even if doing so prevented individual
firms from competing as forcefully as they could.24  Structuralists
believed that true unfettered competition required many market
participants.  To achieve this, antitrust law needed to actively pro-
tect the weaker firms in the market.25
Starting in the 1960s, structuralism’s dominance slowly began to
wane as new economic research out of the University of Chicago
gained prominence. Scholars associated with the up-and-coming
Chicago School26 argued that a competitive market was one where
unfettered rivalries between firms pushed prices down, increased
output, and spurred innovation.27 Such competition enhanced con-
sumer welfare and increased economic efficiency, benefitting the
free-enterprise system as a whole. To the Chicago School, the goal
of antitrust law was to enhance consumer welfare by encouraging
this type of cut-throat competition. The Chicago School did not
mind market concentration because, as less-efficient firms were
forced out of the market, efficiency would grow and consumers
would benefit. New economic research supported this argument: it
suggested that effective competition could occur with a few large
firms in a market, and that protecting many small, inefficient com-
petitors merely to avoid concentration actually led to higher prices,
21. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (merger illegal because the
resulting firm would have efficiencies that none of its rivals could meet); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (merger illegal because the resulting firm could undersell
its competitors); see also ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 18, at 34.
22. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 18, at 34; HOVENKAMP, supra note 18,
at 2.
23. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 37; see also ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N,
supra note 18, at 34; see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, 78
ANTITRUST L. J. 1, 74–76 (2012).
24. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 36–37.
25. See id.
26. Primary examples include Robert Bork, Richard Posner, and Frank Easterbrook.
27. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925, 928 (1979); Harry S. Gerla, Restoring Rivalry as a Central Concept in Antitrust Law, 75
NEB. L. REV. 209, 210–11 & n.4 (1996).
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lower output, and decreased efficiency—effects that harmed con-
sumers.28 In other words, the Chicago School argued that
structuralism, as an economic theory, was wrong.
The Chicago School also argued that many of the market struc-
tures and business practices previously condemned by courts as per
se illegal were in fact beneficial to competition. Chicago School the-
orists therefore urged courts to allow defendants to proffer
economic arguments for how their behavior was procompetitive
and beneficial to consumers, and to permit behavior that under ex-
isting law would be per se illegal where procompetitive effects
outweighed anticompetitive ones.29
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court endorsed the Chicago School’s
reasoning, pronouncing that “antitrust laws . . . were enacted for
‘the protection of competition, not competitors’”30 and describing the
Sherman Act as a “consumer welfare prescription.”31 In 1977, with
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,32 the Court began a sys-
tematic dismantling of many of the per se rules it created over the
prior fifty years, “increasingly turn[ing] to modern economic the-
ory to inform its interpretation and application of the Sherman
Act” through the use of the “rule of reason.”33
In contrast to a per se offense, when conduct is examined under
the rule of reason, courts look not just at the type of conduct in-
volved, but also at whether that conduct actually has a negative
effect on competition.  This involves a complex inquiry into “the
facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the
reasons why it was imposed.”34 Defendants are allowed to proffer
reasons for why the challenged conduct is beneficial—rather than
harmful—to consumers. Economists are brought in by both sides to
testify, producing complex models using economic theory to show
the effects of the conduct. Under a rule of reason analysis, a court
will only find conduct illegal if it determines that the conduct had
28. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 18, at 34.
29. See GELLHORN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 105 (5th ed. 2004); ANTITRUST
MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 18, at 33.
30. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
31. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)).
32. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–59 (1977).
33. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 18, at 36 (quoting GAVIL ET AL.,
ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 358
(2002)).
34. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
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or will have a negative impact on competition.35 Although a hand-
ful of business practices are still examined under a per se test, most
conduct today is analyzed using the “rule of reason.”36
B. Catalog of Exemptions
Together, the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal
Trade Commission Act bar anticompetitive behavior involving trade
or commerce. Because modern courts construe trade or commerce
broadly, almost any conduct that involves an exchange of money or
bartering for a good or service is subject to antitrust law.37 To pre-
vent antitrust law’s broad application in areas where they have felt it
unwarranted, the courts and Congress have read and written nu-
merous exemptions into antitrust law over the past eighty years.38
For example, the Supreme Court created Noerr-Pennington immu-
nity to protect political lobbying efforts from antitrust challenge,39
35. The rule of reason was first applied in 1911 by the Supreme Court in Standard Oil
Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), which distinguished between the mere
possession of monopoly power (which does not violate the Sherman Act) and the use of that
power to restrain trade (which does). The rule of reason emerged again in the late 1970s
with Cont’l T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 36 (implementing a rule of reason standard for vertical
nonprice restraints), and continued to spread in the 1990s and 2000s with State Oil Co. v.
Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (establishing the rule of reason standard for vertical maximum
resale price maintenance agreements), and Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements). See Mau-
rice Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1379–80
(2009).
36. See Stucke, supra note 35, at 1379–82.
37. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 7–8. Note the limited
exception for professional baseball. Id. at 3.
38. It is important to mention judicially created immunities briefly, although they are
generally outside the scope of this Note. The largest problem with statutorily created exemp-
tions is that they are enacted in one fell swoop and then left, without amendment, for the
foreseeable future. Their continuing validity is rarely, if ever, examined, and only a few are
ever repealed. Judicially created immunities do not pose the same problems, because lower
courts—and, periodically, the Supreme Court—regularly review the scope of the doctrine.
See, e.g., FTC v. Phoebe Putney, 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013); see also AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 21.
39. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is a judicially created doctrine announced by the
Supreme Court in two cases: Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Together,
Noerr and Pennington announce that an individual cannot be held liable in antitrust for peti-
tioning the government to act in an anticompetitive way. The immunity is premised on the
theory that if antitrust law were allowed to question lobbying efforts, it would raise First
Amendment concerns and might chill legitimate lobbying efforts. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137;
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670. This immunity has a limited exception: if the petitioning effort is
a “mere sham”—for instance, where the actor is using the petitioning process to impede
competition and does not actually care whether the government body they are petitioning
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Parker immunity to immunize state regulatory action from scru-
tiny,40 and Koegh immunity to prohibit private treble damages suits
where the plaintiff claims that a rate submitted to and approved by
a regulator violated antitrust law.41
The majority of antitrust exemptions, however, were written into
law by Congress. A leading Monograph by the American Bar Associ-
ation Section of Antitrust Law organizes these statutory exemptions
into three general categories.42 For the sake of simplicity, this Note
will use that organizational system.
The first category consists of exemptions for an entire industry or
type of activity in favor of state or national regulation. For example,
the Shipping Act of 1916 exempted the ocean shipping industry
from antitrust scrutiny,43 and the Transportation Act of 1920 immu-
nized railroad mergers and other agreements.44 In 1945, Congress
passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act, immunizing the “business of in-
surance” from federal antitrust scrutiny and leaving regulation to
the states.45 Congress enacted the last broad statutory exemptions
in the mid-1940s.46 As the era of deregulation took hold in the
ultimately takes the action for which they are petitioning—then immunity under Noerr-Pen-
nington is not available. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144. For example, a trucking company that makes a
series of baseless objections to a potential competitor’s licensing solely to increase the com-
petitor’s expenses and delay their entry into the market, without any hope of actually
achieving denial, would be unable to claim Noerr-Pennington immunity. See, e.g., Cal. Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
40. The Parker Doctrine was created by the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1943), and clarified in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S.
97 (1980). It holds that state legislators and regulators may act anticompetitively as long as
their intent to displace competition is clearly articulated and the anticompetitive policy is
actively supervised by the state. See also Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568–69 (1984).
41. The Keogh doctrine, also called the Filed-Rate Doctrine, was created by the Supreme
Court in Keogh v. Chicago Northwest Railway, 260 U.S. 156 (1922). The doctrine was created at
a time when firms operating in a regulated industry were often required to file proposed
rates for review with regulators. Regulators would only approve a rate if it was “fair and rea-
sonable.” The Supreme Court created the Keogh doctrine on the premise that only the
relevant regulatory body had authority to review and change rates—even if the rate was in-
flated because of unlawful price fixing. In the second half of the twentieth century, the
United States underwent a period of deregulation, so the Keogh doctrine carries little remain-
ing effect. The few remaining industries required to submit rates do so more out of formality
than necessity, as regulating agencies do not substantively review rates. See ANTITRUST MOD-
ERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 18, at 340–41.
42. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 31–52.
43. Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728.
44. Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 407, 41 Stat. 456, 480–82 (1934). In 1948,
Congress passed the Reed-Bulwinkle Act, ch. 491, 62 Stat. 472 (1948), which added some
price-fixing agreements to the list of exemptions enjoyed by the railroad industry alone.
45. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006).
46. The last two exemptions to go into effect were the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945
and the Reed-Bulwinkle Act in 1948. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra
note 12, at 34.
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1950s and 1960s, most of the exemptions in this category were re-
pealed or substantially modified. Today, only five such exemptions
remain.47 Each remaining exemption provides for oversight of an
industry through regulation in theory, although in practice over-
sight is often limited.48
The second category consists of exemptions for specific transac-
tions, practices, or events that are thought to be socially desirable or
economically beneficial. As of 2006, nineteen exemptions fell into
this category.49 Some authorize naked price fixing or market alloca-
tion,50 while others allow joint ventures or sales agreements that
47. The five schemes currently in effect are: the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011–1015 (2006), which exempts the “business of insurance” if “regulated by state law”;
the Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 40101–42307 (2006), which exempts agreements between
members of ocean shipping conferences to set and publish fixed rates for specific routes; the
Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2006), which works in conjunction with the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act, 7 U.S.C. § 608b (2006) to exempt agricultural cooperatives and
some agreements between farmers and agricultural processors about how to market, price, or
restrict output for a particular crop; the Fishermen’s Collective Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 521–522 (2006), which functions much like the Capper-Volstead Act to allow fishing coop-
eratives to collectively market fish; and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which operates alongside
sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act. Together, the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Clayton Act
provide an exemption for labor union activities. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 17–31 (repealed);
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–113 (2006). The Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47
Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–113), replaced the Clayton Act § 20, expanding
the once-modest limitation on injunctions in labor disputes. See United States v. Hutcheson,
312 U.S. 219 (1941); see also AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 38.
48. This is particularly true for fishing and agricultural cooperatives. Although the Cap-
per-Volstead Act provides limited oversight of cooperatives, it has no effective institutional
capacity to enforce its regulatory decisions. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
supra note 12, at 35. If a cooperative charges excessive prices, the Secretary of Agriculture can
review and condemn those prices, and has started investigations into excessive pricing on
seven separate occasions. However, none of the investigations actually resulted in action by
the Secretary of Agriculture. Furthermore, the Secretary has no authority over the internal
operations of cooperatives. Id. at 101–02; see also Ralph H. Folsom, Antitrust Enforcement under
the Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1623, 1634–37 (1980). Similarly,
the Secretary of Commerce has the power under the Fishing Cooperative Act to block agree-
ments to charge an “enhanced” price. See 15 U.S.C. § 522 (2006); AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 37. But, the writers of the ABA Monograph could not find
any instance in which the Secretary actually exercised this regulatory authority. Id. The au-
thors suggest that this is because a series of court decisions in the 1940s and 1950s effectively
stripped the Secretary of Commerce of his oversight ability under the Act. See id. Addition-
ally, under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, regulatory oversight of the insurance industry was
left to the states; accordingly, the rigor of oversight varies widely from state to state. See id. at
35, 133, 141–46.
49. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 38–49.
50. There are eight exemptions that fit into this subcategory. They include the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3364(e) (2006), as modified by the Natural Gas Wellhead
Decontrol Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (authorizing natural gas pipeline
companies to enter into market allocation agreements in the event of a gas shortage and
exempting such agreements from antitrust scrutiny if approved by the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission); the Anti-Hog Cholera Serum Act, 7 U.S.C. § 852 (2006) (exempting a
marketing agreement governing price and other sales conditions between Anti-Hog Cholera
538 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 47:2
would otherwise be illegal.51 Two immunize a specific merger
or types of mergers.52 Some of the exemptions in this category re-
place antitrust liability with regulatory oversight,53 while others do
Serum Producers if approved by the Secretary of Agriculture); the Defense Production Act,
50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2061–2171 (2006) (exempting market allocation of military materials from
antitrust scrutiny during a national emergency, if approved by the Secretary of Defense); 49
U.S.C. § 40129 (2006) (exempting certain agreements between competing air carriers to al-
locate landing rights at airports); Television Program Improvements Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C.
§ 303c(c) (2006) (authorizing persons in the television industry to agree on guidelines “to
alleviate the negative impact of violence in telecast material” without antitrust scrutiny); 16
U.S.C. § 824k(e)(1) (2006) (exempting price fixing and other traditionally anticompetitive
conduct in the electric power market from antitrust scrutiny by granting exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the FERC); Charitable Gift Annuity Antitrust Relief Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 37–37a (2006);
ICC Termination Act of 1995, 49 U.S.C. § 13703 (2006) (exempting collective agreements
between motor carriers that set rates for moves of household goods). See AM. BAR ASS’N SEC-
TION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 38–42.
51. Exemptions pertaining to joint ventures or sales agreements include: Webb-Pomer-
ene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61–66 (2006) (authorizing the creation and operation of joint ventures
to sell products of American companies overseas, subject to supervision by the Federal Trade
Commission); Export Trading Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4003 (2006) (authorizing
the creation and operation of joint ventures to sell products of American companies over-
seas, subject to supervision by Secretary of Commerce); Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295 (2006) (authorizing collective sale of broadcasting rights to professional
basketball, football, baseball, and hockey games); Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1801–1804 (2006) (immunizing joint ventures between newspapers that contain otherwise
unlawful price-fixing agreements, market allocations, and revenue pooling, provided that
one of the newspapers in the joint venture is failing); Agreement Relating to the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Satellite Organization “Intelsat,” Art. XV(c), Aug. 20, 1971, 23
U.S.T. 3814 and Headquarters Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, ¶ 16, Nov. 22–24,
1976, 28 U.S.T. 2249 (exempting together, by treaty obligation, COMSAT, a common carrier
of satellite communications for its conduct in serving INTELSAT, which is an international
regulatory body); Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 638(d) (immunizing research and develop-
ment joint ventures between small businesses if approved by the administrator of the Small
Business Association and the Attorney General); 49 U.S.C. § 41308 (2006) (exempting coop-
erative agreements about international air travel if approved by the Secretary of
Transportation); 49 U.S.C. § 42111 (2006) (allowing mutual aid agreements between air car-
riers if there is a strike that affects international air travel); 15 U.S.C. § 37b (2006)
(immunizing the matching program used to place medical school graduates with resident
programs). See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 43–47.
52. See Professional Football League Merger Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295 (2006) (au-
thorizing the merger of the NFL and AFL football leagues); 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2) (2006)
(immunizing merger agreements between railroads that are approved by the Surface Trans-
portation Board) and 49 U.S.C. § 10706(a)(3)(B)(ii) (2006) (requiring direct proof of
conspiracy in a price-fixing conspiracy antitrust suits against a railroad); see also AM. BAR ASS’N
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 48–49.
53. For example, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3364(e) (2006), as
modified by the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, allows gas pipeline operators
to agree on how to allocate gas supplies when faced with a natural gas shortage, subject to
supervision by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Without this exemption, such an
agreement would likely violate section 1 of the Sherman Act as a per se illegal horizontal
price-fixing agreement. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 32.
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not.54 Some of these exemptions, like the Anti-Hog Cholera Serum
Act,55 appear to have little relevance today; however, this category
of exemptions is the only one that continues to expand.56
One frequently cited example of an exemption that falls into this
category is the Newspaper Preservation Act.57 The Act immunizes
joint ventures between newspapers that contain otherwise unlawful
price-fixing agreements, market allocations, and revenue pooling,
provided that one of the newspapers in the joint venture is failing.
The Act was passed because legislators believed that it was impor-
tant for society to have a large number of local newspapers with
different editorial viewpoints, and many had begun to fail.58
The third category of statutory exemptions includes limited mod-
ifications of antitrust law for the benefit of some class of activity.59
The exemptions in this category often modify the remedy that a
plaintiff may seek or the substantive standard the plaintiff must
54. For example, the Charitable Gift Annuity Antitrust Relief Act allows charities to
jointly set rates for annuities without any federal oversight. 15 U.S.C. §§ 37–37a (2006); see
also AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 33.
55. This Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to approve a cartel-like marketing
agreement among suppliers of an anti-hog cholera vaccine, including rules setting prices and
governing other sales conditions, if firms producing 75 percent of the total volume of the
vaccine agree. It then exempts any firms participating in the cartel from antitrust prosecu-
tion. 7 U.S.C. § 852 (2006). For a more detailed description, see AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 39–40. There are currently no agreements under this provi-
sion. Id. at 40.
56. The newest exemption to enter into effect was the Medical Resident Matching Pro-
gram Exemption, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 37b (2006). This exemption immunizes sponsoring,
conducting, or participating in a graduate medical education residency-matching program.
See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 18, at 348.
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1804 (2006).
58. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 242–44.
59. The exemptions in the third category are: Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3503 (2006) (requiring courts to consider whether trademarked soft
drinks are “in substantial and effective competition with other products of the same general
class” when evaluating horizontal market division agreements between soft drink bottlers and
producers); Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (2006) and Bank Holding Company Act,
12 U.S.C. § 1849(b) (2006) (requiring courts to consider the convenience and needs of the
community when deciding whether to allow a particular bank merger that might otherwise
be unlawful, exempting consummated mergers, staying mergers until any litigation is com-
plete, and shortening the statute of limitations on challenges to proposed bank mergers);
National Cooperative Research and Production Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4106 (2006) (elimi-
nating treble damages for qualified joint ventures and modifying the rule of reason
standard); Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
237, 118 Stat. 661 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4304) (eliminating treble damages and
modifying the rule of reason standard for Standards Development Organizations); Health
Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111–11152 (2006) (raising the burden of
proof for antitrust challenges to peer review procedures for medical practitioners, and elimi-
nating private rights of action for damages); Local Government Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 34–36 (2006) (eliminating treble damages liability for local governments who violate anti-
trust laws and limiting relief for private plaintiffs to an injunction). See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION
OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 49–52.
540 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 47:2
meet in order to prove a breach of antitrust law.60 Sometimes, the
substantive standard ordered by Congress effectively operates as
complete immunity. For example, the Soft Drink Interbrand Com-
petition Act required courts to examine horizontal market division
agreements between soft drink bottlers and producers using a rule
of reason-like analysis.61 But, because the Act also requires plaintiffs
to show a lack of “substantial and effective competition” among bot-
tlers, courts have determined that this additional requirement
creates effective immunity for soft drink trademark holders and
their bottlers.62
C. Traditional Justifications for Antitrust Exemptions
Today, the antitrust community largely views statutory exemp-
tions as special interest legislation that is harmful both to the
legitimacy of the government’s regulation of the economy and to
economic progress.63 Many exemptions have aroused this sentiment
since the time of their passage.64 However, supporters of each statu-
tory exemption were able to proffer at least some public policy
reasons for each exemption’s necessity. To understand why so many
60. For example, the Local Government Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34–36 (2006), allows
plaintiffs to bring suit against local government officials acting in their official capacity for
violation of antitrust laws but limits relief to an injunction. Similarly, the National Coopera-
tive Research and Production Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4306 (2006), eliminates treble damages
liability for registered research joint ventures and requires courts to apply a specific form of
“rule of reason” analysis when determining whether the challenged conduct of the joint ven-
ture is legal. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 33.
61. See H.R. Rep. No. 96-1118 at 2, 4–6 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2373.
62. See, e.g., Penn. ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 175–76 (3d Cir.
1988).
63. See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 18, at 335; AM. BAR ASS’N
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 27; Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Why
More Antitrust Immunity for the Media Is a Bad Idea, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1399, 1402 (2011).  The
idea that exemptions and immunities need to be enacted with caution and largely removed
from the law is not new.  In 1955, two reports on the modernization of antitrust law, the
Stigler Report and the Shenefield Report, called for cutting back on antitrust exemptions
and immunities. The Stigler report was prepared largely by academics associated with the
University of Chicago. The Shenefield Report was prepared by a commission formed by Presi-
dent Carter. Members of Congress filled half of the seats. See Stephen Calkins, Antitrust
Modernization: Looking Backwards, 31 J. CORP. L. 421, 436, 440, 448 (2006); NAT’L COMM’N FOR
THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS & PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL (1979) (conventionally known as the Shenefield Report); GEORGE J. STIGLER ET AL.,
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION (1969), reprinted in 115 CONG.
REC. 15,933 (1969) (conventionally known as the Stigler Report).
64. See Newspaper Preservation Act: Hearings on S. 1520 before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the
H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 294–98, 357–63 (1969) (testimony of Richard W. Mc-
Laren, Asst. Atty. Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice) (urging Congress not to pass the
NPA); Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act: Hearings on S. 598 before the Subcomm. on Antitrust,
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exemptions hold little value today and should be repealed, it is first
necessary to understand the basic arguments typically proffered for
their support. Three arguments appear frequently. Two—natural
monopoly and market or institutional failure—are rooted in eco-
nomics; the third is social-policy based.
1. Natural Monopoly
One common economic justification for antitrust exemptions is
that the market for which an exemption was designed is a natural
monopoly. A natural monopoly occurs when demand within a cer-
tain market is insufficient to support more than one firm, usually
because there are significant entry barriers or because input costs
are too high to allow more than one firm to produce the good at a
minimum efficient scale.65 For example, a remote town with a pop-
ulation of 1,000 can likely support only one gas station. If the
market for gas in that town is a natural monopoly, a second gas
station would either drive the first station out of business or fold
soon after opening because it would be unable to sell a sufficient
quantity of gas to cover its entry or fixed costs.
When a natural monopoly exists, particularly where a firm sells
products without ready substitutes, the firm is essentially unregu-
lated by competition. Even if such firms do not engage in
“monopolizing” behavior that would violate the Sherman Act, the
market might not naturally produce the most efficient result in the
absence of effective competition. Therefore, direct government
regulation of price and output in such a situation might be a better,
more efficient alternative.66
2. Market or Institutional Failure
A second common economic justification for antitrust exemp-
tions is that some characteristic of an industry or market is
preventing that market from operating efficiently—that there is a
market or institutional failure.67 According to this argument, the
Monopoly and Business Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 89–104 (1979) (testi-
mony of William S. Comanor, Director, Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade
Commission); id. at 205–09 (testimony of Eleanor M. Fox, Professor of Law, New York Uni-
versity School of Law); see also David L. Foster et al., The National Cooperative Research Act of
1984 as a Shield From the Antitrust Laws, 5 J.L. & COM. 347 (1985).
65. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 54.
66. Id. at 54–55.
67. See id. at 56.
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only way to retain market efficiency is by fostering coordination be-
tween firms that would ordinarily be illegal (or at least sufficiently
suspect to risk antitrust scrutiny).68 This coordination may take the
form of an otherwise potentially illegal joint venture, information
pooling, price fixing, or market distribution.
This argument was used to explain why research and develop-
ment (R&D) ventures should receive special treatment under the
antitrust laws in the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984.69
The proponents of the Act claimed that the fixed costs associated
with R&D were so high that a smaller firm could not afford to de-
velop a product and, therefore, could not afford to participate in
the market. But, the argument went, the smaller firm could be an
active market participant if it did not have to invest in the full cost
of R&D. The result, according to this argument, was a market fail-
ure because otherwise-viable competitors were removed from the
market, harming competition overall. This market failure could be
“fixed,” supporters explained, by allowing small firms to bind to-
gether through R&D joint ventures, spreading the fixed costs
associated with R&D across multiple firms. This would allow greater
competition in the market.70
Although such joint ventures were not necessarily illegal under
antitrust law, Congress believed that the threat of antitrust prosecu-
tion and the risk of treble damages deterred companies from
entering even the otherwise legal, procompetitive joint ventures of
this kind.71 To fix this market failure, Congress passed the NCRA,
which provided that registered R&D joint ventures would be judged
on a rule of reason standard if subjected to antitrust scrutiny, and
that any successful plaintiff could recover only single damages, not
treble.72 Because rule of reason cases are expensive to prosecute—
particularly when the plaintiff can only recover single damages—
the NCRA lowered the risk associated with entering into R&D joint
ventures, potentially helping to remedy that market failure.73
In justifying the McCarran-Ferguson Act, proponents tell another
version of the market failure story. In most industries, forward-look-
ing price sharing, including predictions of future expenses, is often
illegal because it facilitates price fixing and cartel behavior. But, in
68. See id.
69. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-642, 98 Stat. 1815 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4306 (2006)); see also AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW, supra note 12, at 263–68.
70. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4306.
71. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 265.
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4302–4303.
73. See infra note 111, and accompanying text.
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the insurance industry, proponents claim that information sharing
is essential to efficient pricing.74 The cost of an insurance product is
mostly a function of future expenses, predicted customer-by-cus-
tomer based on each customer’s “risk profile.” The more data to
which an insurance company has access, proponents argue, the
more accurate their risk profiles will be, and the more efficient
their pricing models will become. If multiple firms pool their cus-
tomer data, they can create a far more accurate risk profile than a
single firm acting alone, improving efficiency and reducing the cost
of insurance to consumers.75 Therefore, insurance companies need
an exemption from antitrust laws to share future expense data.76
3. Social Policy
In addition to these economic justifications, some proponents
have justified antitrust exemptions through social policy arguments.
For example, when passing the Newspaper Protection Act, Con-
gress decided that saving dying newspapers in order to ensure a
citizenry educated by diverse editorial viewpoints was more impor-
tant than letting inefficient competitors drop out of the market.77
Similarly, in the Sports Broadcasting Act (SBA), Congress author-
ized league-wide exclusive television agreements in professional
football, basketball, baseball, and hockey—agreements that, shortly
before enactment of the SBA, were found to violate antitrust laws.78
The Act allowed professional sports leagues to pool their broadcast-
ing rights for sale, thereby increasing profits through behavior
otherwise prohibited by the Sherman Act.79 Accordingly, the SBA
can be seen as an attempt to subsidize professional sports that Con-
gress views as socially desirable.80
Most often, those supporting antitrust exemptions employ some
combination of economic and public policy justifications in support
74. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 137.
75. See Statutory Immunities and Exemptions: The McCarran-Ferguson Act, Public Hearing Before
the Antitrust Modernization Commission 7–9, 40–41, 48–49 (Oct. 18, 2006) (statement and testi-
mony of Michael McRaith), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_
hearings/pdf/061018_Final_McCarran.pdf [hereinafter McCarran-Ferguson Act Hearing]; see
also id. at 14–16, 32–33 (statement and testimony of Julie Gackenbach).
76. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 18, at 350–51.
77. Id. at 79–80.
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295 (2006), reversing United States v. NFL, 196 F. Supp. 445
(E.D. Pa. 1961); see also AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 217.
79. See Ross C. Paolino, Upon Further Review: How NFL Network Is Violating the Sherman Act,
16 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 6–9 (2009).
80. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 79.
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of their proposals. However, just because economic and social pol-
icy concerns were cited when each statutory exemption was enacted
does not mean that those concerns were well-founded, nor does it
mean that such reasons were the actual impetus behind the
legislation.
II. REFORM IS OVERDUE
A. Current Attitudes Toward Statutory Exemptions
Today, much of the antitrust community disfavors statutory ex-
emptions.81 Many scholars believe that, regardless of the rationale
stated during debate, statutory exemptions are often special inter-
est legislation, passed at the behest of a particular industry without
full consideration of the larger social or economic impact.82 Courts
tend to view exemptions with suspicion and, as a result, read them
narrowly. In examining a statutory exemption for the sports broad-
casting industry,83 for example, Judge Easterbrook bluntly stated
that “[t]he Sports Broadcasting Act is special interest legislation, a
single-industry exception to a law designed for the protection of the
public.”84 He therefore condoned court decisions limiting the ex-
emption to what was specifically provided for in the text:
“Recognition that special interest legislation enshrines results
rather than principles is why courts read exceptions to the antitrust
laws narrowly, with beady eyes and green eyeshades.”85
Government enforcers of antitrust laws are similarly suspicious of
statutory exemptions. While advocating against the passage of a new
exemption for credit card fees in 2008, the Principal Deputy Assis-
tant Attorney General for Antitrust, Keith B. Nelson, stated that the
Department of Justice “believes that antitrust exemptions can be
justified only in very rare instances, when the fundamental free-
market values underlying the antitrust laws are compellingly out-
weighed by a clearly paramount and clearly incompatible public
81. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 18, at 335; AM. BAR ASS’N SEC-
TION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 27; Stucke & Grunes, supra note 63, at 1402 (“The
broad consensus among the legal and academic antitrust community is that antitrust exemp-
tions are rarely a good thing.”).
82. See Stucke & Grunes, supra note 63, at 1402.
83. Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295 (2006).
84. Chicago Prof’l Sports v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 671–72 (7th Cir. 1992).
85. Id.
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policy objective.”86 He explained that the Department of Justice is
reluctant to support new exemptions because “antitrust laws are the
chief legal protector of the free-market principles on which the
American economy is based.”87 Further, “[c]ompanies free from
competitive pressures have incentives to raise prices, reduce output,
and limit investments in expansion and innovation to the detriment
of the American consumer.”88
Antitrust scholars have taken a similar position. In its 2007 mono-
graph on statutory exemptions, the American Bar Association
Section on Antitrust noted that none of the nine exemptions ex-
amined in detail “appear[ed] to have a reasonable, public interest
justification today.”89 Its authors observed that some exemptions
are “for practical purposes irrelevant . . . [or] have proven
unnecessary.”90
Even more troubling to the Section on Antitrust, however, were
those exemptions that continued to actively harm society, exemp-
tions that had authorized “private parties to exploit market power
for their own benefit without any oversight mechanism to ensure
that private gains would be devoted to public interest goals,” and
which had transferred wealth without producing “the public inter-
est benefits on which they were initially justified.”91 Ultimately, the
authors recommended that all existing exemptions be removed or
amended, and that future use of exemptions be curtailed or discon-
tinued completely.92
Likewise, the Antitrust Modernization Commission, a body of an-
titrust experts established by Congress to make recommendations
on how antitrust law should be reformed, found in their 2007 Re-
port that “statutory exemptions undermine, rather than upgrade,
the competitiveness and efficiency of the U.S. economy,” and urged
Congress to revisit and repeal many of the exemptions currently in
place.93
86. Letter from Keith B. Nelson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Lamar Smith, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (June 23, 2008), avail-
able at http://www.vantagecard.com/images/DOJResponsetoSmithLetter6-23-08.pdf.
(arguing in opposition to the Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 293.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 292.
93. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 18, at 335.
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B. Categorization of Current Exemptions by Effectiveness
and Harmfulness
This Note posits that existing antitrust exemptions can be di-
vided into three general categories: exemptions that are harmless
but irrelevant, exemptions that actively harm competition and soci-
ety by transferring wealth to private groups without corresponding
public benefits, and exemptions that may continue to be beneficial.
The first category consists of statutory exemptions that have so
little relevance today that no one is likely to push for or challenge
their proposed repeal. Many of these exemptions highlight an im-
portant problem with statutory exemptions more generally: even if
a statutory exemption was well-tailored to fix an economic or social
policy concern at the time of its passage, that concern may have
ceased to exist while the exemption remains in place. Statutory ex-
emptions do not have the flexibility to adapt to changing markets,
economic theories, and public policy goals.
Antitrust laws in the United States are not spelled out in intricate
detail in the United States Code. They consist of a bare-bones
statutory framework that underlies substantive judge- and agency-
created doctrine that changes over time with advances in economic
thinking. With this construction, antitrust laws can adapt as eco-
nomic theories and market conditions change. Statutory
exemptions, with detailed provisions designed to remedy unfavora-
ble conditions at a given period in time, cannot. As a result,
conditions change and the laws grow stale.
One example in this category is the Anti-Hog Cholera Serum Act,
which, with the blessing of the Secretary of Agriculture, authorizes
a price-fixing cartel of anti-hog cholera serum producers.94 Hog
cholera was officially eradicated in the United States in 1978, and
with the eradication came the demise of anti-hog cholera serum
production.95 There has not been an approved cartel, or an attempt
to install an improved cartel, for years.96  Another similarly irrele-
vant exemption is contained within the Defense Production Act.97
The Act authorizes blatant market division of military materials
markets during times of national emergency and exempts those
market division agreements from antitrust scrutiny. The Act was
94. Anti-Hog Cholera Serum Act, 7 U.S.C. § 852 (2006).
95. See Hog Cholera Declared Eradicated in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1978, at 12. For a
history of the effort to eradicate hog cholera, see Sci. & Educ. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
Eradicating Hog Cholera, AGRIC. RES., Mar. 1978, at 8, available at http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/
timeline/cholera.htm.
96. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 39–40.
97. See 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2061–2171 (2006).
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passed in 1950 but has never once been used.98 These exemptions
are irrelevant today, and their continued existence poses no real
threat to competition or society more generally. The only serious
objection one can make to these exemptions is symbolic—that they
muddy the antitrust laws and take up room in the United States
Code.
The second category of antitrust exemptions includes those that
“authorize private parties to exploit market power for their own
benefit,” transferring wealth without producing “the public interest
benefits for which they were initially justified,”99 which unquestiona-
bly harms competition and society. The exemptions in this category
without question have not created the public gains promised when
they were enacted, and should be removed for the sake of eco-
nomic competitiveness. Unlike irrelevant exemptions, these
exemptions are likely to have powerful supporters who will lobby
for their retention. Those powerful supporters likely engage in the
exempted conduct and therefore benefit from the exemption’s
continued existence.
One example in this category is the Wholesale Power Act, which
exempts price fixing and other traditionally anticompetitive con-
duct in the electric power market from antitrust scrutiny.100 The Act
granted this exemption without providing an alternative regulatory
scheme or any other means to deter anticompetitive conduct that
are actually enforced. This exemption thus allows suppliers of
wholesale electricity to increase their earnings at the expense of
consumers.101 The Act continues to extract higher prices from con-
sumers today, harming efficiency and competition as a whole.102
The third category consists of exemptions whose repeal is more
controversial because there is evidence of a past or ongoing benefit
to society. One example is the McCarran-Ferguson Act. As discussed
above, the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry
from antitrust scrutiny for certain information-sharing arrange-
ments.103 This particular exemption has received significant
attention in recent years. Bills proposing the exemption’s repeal,
98. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 40.
99. Id.
100. See 16 U.S.C. § 824k(e)(1) (2006).
101. See generally Peter Carstensen, Presentation at the American Bar Association Antitrust
Section Program: The Antitrust Modernization Commission at Mid-Course (June 9, 2006),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/re
port_amc-transcript.authcheckdam.pdf.
102. See generally id.
103. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
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however, have died in committee.104 The Antitrust Modernization
Commission held an entire hearing on the McCarran-Ferguson Act
alone,105 and academic literature surrounding the repeal of the Act
has been particularly active.106
As expected, the insurance industry has objected vociferously to
suggestions of reform.107 The primary argument presented by sup-
porters of the Act is that sharing cost data is actually procompetitive
because it enables insurers, particularly smaller insurers, to reasona-
bly assess risk and compete effectively.108 But whether the conduct
exempted by the Act would even be illegal under antitrust law today
is questionable and, even were it to be challenged, such activity
would be judged under the rule of reason, with due consideration
given to any procompetitive effects.109 Absent the exemption, data
sharing would be subject to no more scrutiny than in other indus-
tries: procompetitive data sharing would be allowed, while anti-
competitive data sharing would be illegal under the rule of reason.
The exemption contained in the McCarran-Ferguson Act would
make more sense if antitrust law today were primarily enforced us-
ing a per se illegal standard, as exposure to antitrust scrutiny would
prevent both procompetitive and anticompetitive data sharing. But
one of the benefits of the rule of reason approach for agreements
such as these is that it distinguishes between actions that are
procompetitive in a particular situation and those that are not, en-
couraging the former while prohibiting the latter. If the only real
justification proffered in support of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is
that such data sharing is procompetitive, it is not clear what benefit
this exemption provides today.
An alternative explanation for the insurance industry’s support
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is that it gives the industry the tools
it needs to inflate prices through conscious parallelism if not actual
104. See, e.g., Health Insurance Industry Antitrust Enforcement Act of 2013, H.R. 99,
113th Cong. (2013) (eliminating most of the McCarran-Ferguson’s insurance industry
exemption).
105. McCarran-Ferguson Act Hearing, supra note 75.
106. See, e.g., Chris Sagers, Much Ado About Possibly Pretty Little: McCarran-Ferguson Repeal in
the Health Care Reform Effort, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 365 (2010).
107. See, e.g., NAMIC Starts Web Weapon to Keep McCarran-Ferguson, PROPERTY CASUALTY 360°
(Apr. 16, 2007), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2007/04/16/namic-starts-web-wea
pon-to-keep-mccarran-ferguson; NAMIC Opposes ‘Misguided’ Efforts to Repeal McCarran-Ferguson
Exemption, NAMIC, http://www.namic.org/Home/ReadArticle/98ecaec6-2425-4a8a-a431-a2f
51fb56f77 (last updated Mar. 26, 2010).
108. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 18, at 351; see also McCarran-Fergu-
son Act Hearing, supra note 75, at 7–9, 40, 48–49 (statement and testimony of Michael
McRaith); id. at 14–16, 32–33 (statement and testimony of Julie Gackenbach).
109. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 18, at 351.
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price fixing.110 A more benign explanation is that the industry is
afraid that the cost of defending a rule of reason suit is so high that
it would deter even procompetitive behavior.111 However, the insur-
ance industry has not made clear why the risks and costs associated
with rule of reason litigation are any larger in the insurance indus-
try than in any other industry so as to justify different treatment.
After enjoying sixty-eight years of immunity, the industry should at
least be required to explain to Congress why it deserves special
treatment.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Once in place, exemptions are rarely revisited,112 and powerful
industries continue to lobby for new ones.113 For example, regard-
less of whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act remains warranted or
not, every attempt to repeal the Act has failed. In fact, every recent
attempt to reform any current statutory exemption has failed.114
The harm, or, at the very least, the ineffectiveness of many of these
statutory exemptions is neither partisan nor heartily contested by
antitrust experts.115 But efforts to repeal exemptions rarely gain
110. See, e.g., Benjamin Holland Able, Model-Based Pricing in Hurricane Insurance: A Case
Study for Judicial Reform of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 46 MICH. J. L. REFORM 1029, 1045–46
(2013).
111. If the principle fear is that the cost of defending a rule of reason suit would deter
procompetitive conduct, perhaps a better alternative to the current exemption would be to
draft a new exemption allowing antitrust scrutiny but limiting damages to single damages,
rather than treble damages, similar to the National Cooperative Research and Production
Act. This would deter private plaintiffs from bringing a rule of reason suit, because the poten-
tial single-damages recovery is unlikely to warrant the costs of bringing such a suit. See
discussion supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
112. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 4.
113. See the Medical Resident Matching Program Exemption, contained in 15 U.S.C.
§ 37b (2006). For examples of recent proposed statutory exemptions that were not ultimately
enacted, see Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, S. 3715, 112th Cong. (2012);
Credit Card Fair Fees Act of 2008, H.R. 5546, 110th Cong. (2008).
114. Members of Congress occasionally introduce bills repealing or limiting existing stat-
utory exemptions, but over the past few years such attempts have died in committee. See
Health Insurance Industry Antitrust Enforcement Act of 2013, H.R. 99, 113th Cong. (2013)
(eliminating most of the McCarran-Ferguson’s insurance industry exemption); Internet Ra-
dio Fairness Act of 2012, H.R. 6480, 112th Cong. (2012) (limiting current statutory
exemptions for joint ventures between sound recording copyright holders).
115. This does not mean, however, that the repeal of many of these antitrust exemptions
will face little resistance. The industries currently benefitting from exemptions earned the
exemptions initially because those industries had the political clout to raise their issue to
lawmakers. For many exemptions, participants in the benefitted industries have profited,
often enormously, from the lack of antitrust regulation, and will likely fight against any at-
tempted repeal. Additionally, it is likely that the repeal of certain antitrust exemptions, such
as those that benefit farmers or labor, will be politically charged. But, even disregarding the
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traction. Interest groups advocating for an exemption may be pow-
erful and strongly motivated, but groups advocating against an
exemption are often fragmented and have little stake in pursuing
repeal.116
Any effective solution must do two things. First, it must provide a
way to review the statutory exemptions currently in place to deter-
mine whether they are still necessary and beneficial to society.
Second, it must switch the default from one where a statutory ex-
emption, once enacted, remains on the books until Congress acts
affirmatively to repeal it to one where a statutory exemption is pre-
sumed to expire after a short period of time unless Congress
believes that it is still necessary. Further, any solution must be an
efficient use of congressional time and must break the institutional
stagnation that has prevented the review and repeal of statutory ex-
emptions to date.
This Note’s proposed solution is a federal law containing four
provisions. Specifically, this Note urges Congress to adopt legisla-
tion that (1) imposes a general sunset on all statutory exemptions
after five years, (2) orders the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) to prepare a report on the continuing need for each statu-
tory exemption currently in place, (3) requires the Senate and
House Judiciary Committees to hold hearings on any exemption
that the GAO finds still warranted, and (4) provides that, if the
committees find that an exemption should be renewed after the
hearings, they forward a law overriding the sunset provision for that
exemption to the floor of each house to be voted on, signed by the
President, and put into effect.117
more contentious exemptions, there are a significant number of exemptions that serve no
continuing purpose and are unlikely to draw wide support in Congress.
116. The ABA monograph puts this point well: “If legislative exemptions are to be contin-
ued, there is a need not only for high quality, pre-adoption fact-finding, but also for ongoing
review. However, absent some permanent institutional change Congress will have no incen-
tive to review existing exemptions. It has only rarely done so and then only when the political
will exists in some constituency for change.” AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra
note 12, at 310.
117. A number of the proposals put forth suggest that all exemptions enacted in the
future contain a sunset provision. See id. at 311; ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra
note 18, at 355; Theodore Vorhees, Presentation at the American Bar Association Antitrust
Section Program: The Antitrust Modernization Commission at Mid-Course 198 (June 9,
2006), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust
_law/report_amc-transcript.authcheckdam.pdf. To date, only one statutory exemption, the
Need-Based Educational Aid Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 note (2006), has contained a sunset provision.
The Act allowed certain colleges and universities to collectively design a formula to calculate
need-based financial aid without a charge of illegal price fixing. It was extended twice but
then allowed to expire in 2008. This Note’s proposed reform draws heavily on the history of
the Need-Based Education Aid Act. In addition to the sunset provision, the Act also man-
dated that the Government Accountability Office study the effects of the Act and report to
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A. The Sunset Provision
Perhaps the most critical aspect of this Note’s proposed reform is
the five-year general sunset provision that would apply to all statu-
tory exemptions currently in place.118 This provision switches the
default from one where every exemption remains in effect indefi-
nitely to one where irrelevant and harmful exemptions are
automatically stripped from the law absent an affirmative act by
Congress. This provision will force the proponents of a statutory
exemption to once again make their case for why the exemption is
appropriate.
B. The GAO Report
The provision requiring a GAO report on each existing exemp-
tion is also critical. Few, if any, hearings have been held on the vast
majority of exemptions currently in place. Many exemptions have
not been reconsidered in decades, and no one knows how effective
most statutory exemptions actually are in accomplishing their
stated goals. To reform this area of the law, more information is
desperately needed. The purpose of the GAO report is to uncover
this information.
The GAO report should ask and answer several questions. First, it
should determine whether the conduct immunized by a given statu-
tory exemption could result in antitrust liability today. As explained
in Part I, antitrust law has changed immensely over the past sixty
years in response to evolving economic theory and market condi-
tions. Many behaviors that were once per se illegal are now firmly
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. See Pub. L. 107-72, § 3, 115 Stat. 648 (2001).
The report generated was “very thorough, careful and comprehensive, using a variety of dif-
ferent approaches to analyze the data.” AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note
12, at 43 n.74. The report concluded that the Act had no impact whatsoever on the amount
of financial aid offered to any given student, nor did it have any effect on the likelihood that
a student offered aid would enroll at any particular school. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-06-963, HIGHER EDUCATION: SCHOOLS’ USE OF THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION HAS
NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY OR LIKELIHOOD OF STUDENT ENROLL-
MENT TO DATE 4–6 (2006); AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at
42–43.
118. Although the proposal for which this Note advocates is primarily focused on ridding
the law of statutory exemptions currently in place, it is important to note that any future
exemptions should also contain a sunset provision like the one in the Need-Based Educa-
tional Aid Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 note (2006). Unless Congress writes a sunset provision into every
future exemption enacted, antitrust law will once again become just as muddied as it is today.
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analyzed under the rule of reason and rarely, if ever, found to vio-
late antitrust laws.119 Even many behaviors formerly deemed
anticompetitive under the rule of reason are, when explained
through modern economic theory, likely to be found legal.120 If the
conduct exempted would not actually violate modern antitrust law,
then the exemption is unnecessary and should not be renewed.121
Second, the GAO should determine if the behavior covered by
the exemption actually occurs today, regardless of whether it would
be subject to antitrust liability. Some amendments, like the Anti-
Hog Cholera Serum Act122 and parts of the Defense Production
Act,123 are irrelevant today not because the conduct would be per-
missible under contemporary antitrust laws but because the
problem they were designed to address no longer exists.124 Conduct
that does not occur does not deserve an exemption, and any ex-
isting exemption should be allowed to lapse. Even if future conduct
might warrant an exemption, it is better to repeal the current ex-
emption and require Congress to enact a new one that is tailored to
the circumstances at that later date.
Third, the GAO should ask what justifications were given for the
exemption’s original passage. Was the exemption passed to remedy
some apparent market failure? Was it designed to protect conduct
that Congress deemed socially desirable, despite its anticompetitive
effect? Was it designed to replace antitrust regulation with direct
governmental regulation? Was it purely a reaction to an administra-
tive or court decision finding liability where Congress believed the
behavior was in fact procompetitive? To appropriately judge the
success or failure of any given exemption, it is essential to know the
intent behind its enactment.
Fourth, the GAO should ask, in light of the findings made in the
third inquiry, whether the exemption has served its intended pur-
pose and whether it is still needed today. Has the exemption
119. For example, resale price maintenance agreements were once treated as per se ille-
gal under the Supreme Court’s holding in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220
U.S. 373 (1911). However, with an opinion that sounds like it was taken wholesale from a
Chicago School economic theory textbook, the Supreme Court in 2008 ruled that such
agreements are rarely, if ever, anticompetitive and should be analyzed under the rule of
reason. See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2008); see also
supra Part I.
120. One example is conduct categorized as a nonprice vertical restraint, like a territorial
restriction imposed by a manufacturer on a retailer. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 57–59 (1977).
121. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 18, at 350.
122. 7 U.S.C. § 852 (2006).
123. See 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2061–2172 (2006).
124. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at 39–40; see also supra
notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
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successfully achieved the aims that it was ostensibly enacted to
achieve? Has it actually fostered the socially desirable behavior that
it was designed to encourage? Has the exemption enhanced or
harmed consumer welfare? What does the affected market look like
today in comparison to when the exemption was passed? If the ex-
emption was enacted to enable direct regulation, is there still a
regulatory scheme providing oversight?
C. Hearings and Renewal of Recommended Exemptions Only
The GAO would then compile this information in a report and
clearly recommend whether or not to renew the given exemption.
This report would be submitted to the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees. If the report recommends that a given exemption be
extended, then both committees must, under this Note’s proposed
law, hold a hearing on the exemption. If, after the hearing, the
committees find that the exemption should be renewed, then the
committees must forward a provision overriding the sunset for the
exemption to the floor of each house to be voted on and signed by
the President. In contrast, if the report recommends that the statu-
tory exemption be allowed to expire, and Congress does not decide
on its own to hold hearings or override the sunset provision, then
the exemption will expire at the end of the five-year sunset period.
D. Summary of the Reform Proposal
This reform is not perfect. It requires Congress to act—a require-
ment not easily fulfilled in today’s era of partisan deadlock.
Moreover, it places a heavy burden on the GAO and undoubtedly
comes with costs, some of which will go toward studying exemptions
that, for all practical purposes, cause no harm today. However,
many statutory exemptions currently in effect are undermining the
competitiveness and efficiency of the United States economy and,
to date, no piecemeal reform has worked. Therefore, this Note sug-
gests a bolder, most holistic approach.
This reform allows non-partisan experts in antitrust law to ex-
amine existing exemptions and make recommendations regarding
their continued utility. It then places the burden on supporters of
an exemption to demonstrate, to the GAO and to Congress, why
the exemption is still necessary. Because this solution requires mini-
mal congressional action, it will hopefully limit the risk of political
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deadlock. Further, because it would mandate full committee hear-
ings only on exemptions that remain useful, it would allow the
docket of exemptions to be cleared with little wasted congressional
time. Additionally, because the solution would require Congress to
act affirmatively to retain a statutory exemption, the default would
switch from perpetuating every exemption—regardless of effective-
ness—to automatic sunset of all exemptions absent clear
congressional intent to preserve specified ones.
Overall, this reform is designed to jump start the debate on
whether the more-controversial exemptions currently in effect, like
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, should be repealed. At the same time,
this reform eliminates less controversial, irrelevant exemptions
from the United States Code without wasting Congressional time or
expense on an exemption-by-exemption repeal.
CONCLUSION
  Antitrust law is designed to be an overarching check against an-
ticompetitive conduct that harms the free market system. Statutory
exemptions to antitrust laws are supposed to provide some relief
from this check in cases where natural monopolies or market fail-
ures make the application of antitrust law to a specific industry or to
particular conduct harmful to competition, or where Congress has
decided that some social policy goal is more important than robust
competition. However, many of the statutory exemptions currently
on the books no longer serve their intended purpose. Some are
merely irrelevant, while others actively harm society by transferring
wealth to private individuals and hampering beneficial competi-
tion. It is time for holistic reform. If enacted, this Note’s four-part
legislative solution would make significant progress toward ridding
the law of such stale or harmful exemptions, bringing antitrust law
back to its bedrock principle of protecting economic liberty by pre-
serving competition.
